Existing Clientage and New Incentive Mechanism in Soil and Water Conservation of Loess Plateau
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    Abstract:

    Based on the principal agent theory, the participators in soil and water conservation of loess plateau, and the problems on the existing clientage are analyzed. The new incentive mechanism that can let the agent do as the principal's will is designed.

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杨海娟,周德翼.黄土高原治理中的委托—代理关系及激励机制[J].水土保持通报英文版,2001,(5):72-75

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History
  • Received:June 05,2001
  • Revised:
  • Adopted:
  • Online: November 28,2014
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